'Security' has become prominent in official EU development discourse in recent years, and references to security concerns are routinely included in policy statements and documents. Our objective in this paper is to determine whether security concerns have had a growing influence over EU development policy and aid allocation. If so, we are interested in whether this trend can properly be understood as 'securitisation' in the critical sense that resources are being diverted away from socio-economic development, or whether we should see it as a positive trend towards greater coherence in EU development policy.
"The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development.
Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies should follow the same agenda."
European Security Strategy 2003:13
Introduction
A decade after the release of the European Security Strategy (ESS), its affirmation that development and security policy should work more closely together for the betterment of people in developing countries is still one of its most discussed features. The ESS'
vision of a more comprehensive approach to security and development raises several questions regarding the potential 'securitisation' of EU development policy and foreign aid. Is the EU's approach overly idealistic and uncritical regarding the potential pitfalls of trying to combine security and development policy? Do key concepts that have become prominent since the strategy was launched, such as fragile states and the 'whole-of-government' approach, reflect how European policymakers perceive the new reality of international development? Are decisions about the allocation and objectives of the European Commission's aid budget unduly driven by security concerns? Has the Commission itself used securitisation as a means for increasing its aid budget and its policymaking responsibilities? This paper addresses these questions by discussing how EU policies and aid practices at the interface of security and development have evolved since the turn of the 21 st century.
The securitisation of EU policies has been explored in greater depth in the context of justice and home affairs in general and migration, asylum, border control, data protection in particular (see e.g. Neal, 2009; Huysmans, 1998 Huysmans, , 2006 Hayes and Bunyan, 2003; Loader, 2002) . The concern that EU development policy might also be increasingly 'securitised' became more widely expressed as the EU began to articulate a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and deployed military missions to Africa from 2003 as part of its evolving Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Orbie, 2008:4) .
Some observers have noted parallels between these developments and the 'global war on terrorism' launched following the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 11, 2001 (Banim, 2008; Hout, 2010) , Subsequently, engagement with 'fragile states' and post-conflict peacebuilding have become core focal areas for the EU's external policy (Blockmans et al, 2010:3) . With regards to the issue of state fragility, Hout (2009:16) has argued that the EU's policy formulation demonstrated "strong security overtones, and that the EU response fits in with the overall trend of securitisation of development."
It is clear that 'security' has certainly become a prominent feature in official EU development discourse in recent years, and references to security concerns are But does security's prominence in discourse and practice really mean that a policy area ostensibly oriented toward poverty reduction has become more securitised?
Our objective in this paper is to determine whether security concerns have had a growing influence over EU development policy and aid allocation. If so, we are interested in whether this trend can properly be understood as 'securitisation' in the critical sense that resources are being diverted away from socio-economic development, or whether we should see it as a positive trend towards greater coherence in EU development policy. Our starting point is to ask whose security the policy area is supposed to serve. In simple terms, we posit that if policymaking and implementation are driven primarily by concerns about the security of the donor to the detriment of socio-economic development in partner countries, then the critical perspective of securitisation is legitimately applicable. If EU development policy were 'securitised' in this way, then we would expect European security interests to dominate the policy discourse, decision-making and aid allocations across countries. On the other hand, if security policy in a development context were primarily directed towards protecting vulnerable people in fragile developing countries and providing a stable environment in which institutions can be built and development projects can flourish, then a more positive understanding of policy and aid from the security-development nexus perspective is more appropriate.
EU development policy cannot be completely ring-fenced from security-related policy areas. The gap between the (treaty-based) rhetoric focussing on poverty and reality of development policy has long been bridged by policymakers' desires to pursue shortterm interests -national, institutional and sometimes personal -that have not always coincided with the objective of raising the living standards of ordinary people in developing countries. Geopolitical and local political rivalries, business interests and national foibles have been part of the European development policy story ever since the establishment of aid agencies in the 1960s. The French desire to maintain a close association with its former colonies was at the very origin of European Community development cooperation in 1957. More recently, the need to secure access to raw materials, fight terrorism and prevent illegal migration have all entered the development policy discourse and few observers would argue that these factors do not influence decisions about policy objectives and aid allocation. Moreover, the EU policymaking system, where multiple actors engage and endeavour to push outcomes in their preferred direction, is highly complex. In development policy there are multiple outcomes and since generalisations about motives are not always possible, a more nuanced view is needed. Although there is evidence for securitisation of EU development policy, and some of the aid spent by the Commission has 'security' rather than 'development' objectives, we argue that these trends are part of a general effort to progress toward 'coherence' across the EU's external policies rather than full-fledged and purposeful securitisation of foreign aid. While we argue that securitisation is not the strategic purpose of EU aid, we acknowledge that the EU's efforts to improve the complementarity of security and development policy involve some risk that securitisation may occur as a consequence, which can in some instances have negative consequences for 'core' development objectives.
The rest of this paper discusses in more depth the extent to which EU development policy has become more 'securitised' since the beginning of the new millennium. We analyse four potential indicators of securitisation in the European context: (1) discursive practices, (2) institutions, (3) instruments and (4) the allocation of European Commission aid. Our central focus is on the EU policymaking system as an arena where member states shape policy priorities, and on the Commission as an actor in its own right especially with regard to aid allocation.
The security-development nexus: legal foundations, discursive practices and strategic design
The EU has routinely been evoked as a 'community of law' based on 'shared' if not 'common values.' Since its inception in the early 1950s, the European Community has maintained that peace and development are part of its genetic code and that integration was ultimately aimed at fostering both prosperity and peace by 'domesticating' interstate relations amongst its members, a concept captured by François Duchêne's (1973) notion of a 'civilian power Europe'. Over time, the EU's member states have recognised the added value of addressing international security issues through their common institutions, and the EU has become a 'security actor' with limited (although far from clearly defined) roles. As part of this process, the EU's internal peace and prosperity vision has been adapted for the outside world through the EU's assertion that security and development are mutually enhancing policy objectives of its external relations.
Security is considered a precondition for development -if adequate security provisions are not in place, activities aimed at reducing poverty will most likely fail. Development, in turn, is considered a core component of sustainable conflict resolution (Hadfield and Youngs, 2008 The 2009 Lisbon Treaty, in turn, aimed at improving the coherence of external policies but has not simplified policymaking procedures or responsibilities (Furness, 2012) . The
Treaty abolished the pillar structure of the EU, which had maintained a more-or-less clear dividing line between Community and member state competences. The role of the Commission and the European Parliament in development policymaking was enhanced, especially as some regional and thematic programmes are considered 'delegated acts'
where the Parliament has the right to veto Commission proposals (Malhère, 2012 The 'Security-Development Nexus' as policy framework
While the general question of whether EU development and security policy are interdependent is not really debated, the problematic relationship between the two policy areas has challenged observers and policymakers (Dearden, 2011) . The securitydevelopment relationship "remains an uneasy mix of mutually enhancing connections"
which the EU has never quite managed to master (Youngs, 2007:3) . Several pundits have expressed concern that the problematic relationship between EU security and development might raise the prospect that development goals might be undermined by security interests, either in terms of conflicting objectives (Peter and LoWilla, 2010) , differing timelines (Grimm, 2009) , or simply because aid money might be diverted away from poverty reduction (Vegro, 2010) . Such concerns are far from groundless: development aid is regarded by some EU policymakers as an instrument of 'soft power.'
The EU strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, released alongside the ESS in December 2003, stated that development was one of the 'levers' that the EU could use to pursue the strategy's objectives (European Council, 2003 b) .
Influential EU foreign policy scholars have argued that development should contribute to a European 'grand strategy' that would aim to establish the EU as a global military and economic power (Renard and Biscop, 2009 ). Other observers have welcomed the integration of the broader EU external policy agenda from a development perspective, arguing in favour of the 'developmentalisation' of EU foreign and security policy (Faust and Messner, 2004; Hadfield, 2007; Furness, 2012) . the security-development nexus entered the EU's vocabulary, but the Union has also become more assertive in advocating a comprehensive approach to security and development, especially in Africa.
Regional Strategies: the European Neighbourhood and Africa
EU policy toward its neighbourhood -especially the Middle East and North Africa and to lesser extent Eastern Europe -is arguably more explicitly security-oriented than its policy towards other developing regions. Although the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is financed by official development assistance (ODA) it is generally regarded as foreign policy rather than as development cooperation (Del Sarto and Schumacher, 2005 Council, 2011) . EU member states generally agreed that the Horn of Africa strategy presented a long-term perspective for European policy in the region and the next step would be to coordinate on its implementation.
Over the past decade the EU has developed its lexicon in order to address the interface of development and security policy in conceptual terms. Security -broadly defined -has acquired a prominent place in all of the policy declarations that lay out the framework of EU cooperation with developing regions. It would, however, be overly simplistic to argue that this means EU development policy has become more 'securitised' in the critical, Copenhagen School sense. The security-development nexus has increased in importance to EU development policy in response to the growing recognition that security and development are not separate policy fields to be dealt with by different actors using tailored approaches. Against this backdrop, it is important to grasp how these concepts and approaches are translated into practice through institutions, instruments, missions and aid allocation.
Maintaining the delicate balance: Institutions, instruments and missions

Institutions
The Lisbon Treaty provided the impetus for an institutional evolution aimed at Community programmes and were an important source of country expertise. Their primarily technocratic role has become more political as they have assumed greater responsibilities for managing relations with partner governments (Schulz 2010) . It has been suggested that there is potential to enhance the role of delegations not only in terms of representation but also operationally if there is sufficient commitment to invest in their capacities (Gourlay, 2012) . This process appears to be underway in some cases.
Since the EEAS' launch more than 100 seconded national diplomats have been sent to reinforce political sections in the EU delegations. At the EU delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa the political, peace and security and economic development sections work closely together, and the head of delegation ensures that their work is coordinated.
Instruments
The EU has four main financial instruments that it uses to fund activities at the interface of peace and security policy, mostly in developing countries (see table 1 (approx, 2004 -2010) Source: Furness (2011) The Instrument for Stability (IfS)
The Instrument for Stability is both a budget line and a legal bridge-builder between the development and security policy areas. Since its inception in 2006 the IfS has pursued two main objectives: firstly, to equip the EU with the legal capacity and, second, to provide the EU with the necessary financial means to get involved with rapidly unfolding 5 The CFSP and Athena instruments are explicitly for defending European security and diplomatic interests and are not considered foreign aid. 6 EU member states declare their total EDF contributions as ODA, but the Commission does not include the APF in the ODA it reports to the OECD-DAC.
crisis situations (see Gänzle, 2009; term programmes financed by the EU's geographical development instruments are meant to take over. Secondly, the IfS regulation transposed, for the first time in EU history, the obligation for EU institutions to ensure external policy coherence from 'constitutional' (EU Treaty-based) law into 'normal' ('secondary') legislation (Hoffmeister, 2008) . In fact, the IfS was introduced as opportunity for Commission and The APF's added value, effectiveness and potential have been confirmed by independent evaluations contracted by the Commission (Mackie et al, 2006) and the European Parliament (Vines and Middleton, 2008) . The AU and EU Commissions are enthusiastic about continuing the APF cooperation and improving the instrument's flexibility and efficiency. The APF is an innovative instrument in that it is partly used to pay the expenses of AU soldiers in the field, although ammunition, weapons, solders' salaries and military training are explicitly ineligible. This is widely considered to be an essential component of the shared AU/EU strategy for peace and security. However, this innovation creates legal difficulties for the EU, since the EU Treaties do not allow the community budget to finance activities with military or defence implications. For this reason, the pragmatic decision was taken to finance the APF from the EDF, which is funded directly by member states and has different rules.
The fact that the APF is funded by the EDF can be interpreted as a clear instance of securitisation in that development aid has been diverted to fund peacekeeping operations (Del Biondo et al, 2012: 135) . The Commission acknowledges this and it does not include the APF in the ODA figures it declares to the OECD. 7 Thus far, the numbers have been small, but the securitisation problem has the potential to become more acute unless the thorny legal issues around the APF's financing are resolved. Should demand for the APF grow as the APSA develops, EU member states may find it necessary to establish a separate fund if they want to continue to finance African-led PSOs through the EU (Furness, 2011) .
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Missions
Although the EU's civilian and military missions are officially part of the CSDP, their operation at the interface of development and security policy and their centrality to the EU's development objectives in fragile countries provides a potential entry point for securitisation. The CSDP has variously been described as an expression of the EU's evolving strategic culture (Biava et al, 2011) and as an underwhelming indicator of the EU's 'small power' status (Toje, 2011) . The shortcomings of the missions themselvesespecially the difficulties of coordinating military and civilian actors -have been widely noted. Responsibility for these problems has been attributed not only to actors on the ground but also to an absence of geo-strategic vision on the part of EU policymakers (Youngs, 2011) .
Somalia
Somalia's troubles are not only a challenge for Europe but also for the UN, the AU, East
African governments, China, India and other trading nations that use the Suez Canal route between Europe and Asia. Piracy off the coast of Somalia became a major international issue following several high-profile hijackings, most notably that of the 7 EU member states declare their total EDF contributions as ODA, but the Commission does not declare the APF as ODA.
super-tanker Sirius Star, which was released in January 2009 after the payment of a ransom estimated at $ 3 million. Only one month later, the European anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, EU Naval Force (EUNAVFOR)-Atalanta, reached full operational capacity. Atalanta is part of a bigger mission aimed at protecting maritime trade routes which includes ships from China, NATO and other partners.
The Atalanta operation is defined explicitly in terms of Europe's security interests, but it also has humanitarian objectives. 
Chad
The EUFOR mission to Chad lasted eighteen months from late 2007 until early 2009. The mission involved around 3,700 troops from 23 EU member states, although the majority of the soldiers were French. The mission's mandate was to protect civilians and UN personnel and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, and it carried out these tasks with reasonable success. It was, however, criticised for failing to resolve factors behind the conflicts in Chad, Darfur and the Central African Republic, even though it was not mandated to perform a long-term conflict resolution role (Helly, 2010) . Although the mission was more about providing security to people whose government was neither able nor willing to protect them than about European security interests, it was not well enough resourced to have a significant development impact. Most EU member states were reluctant to commit major resources to the mission with the outcome that it was seriously undermanned and underequipped -indeed, as one commentator argued in the wake of the mission, the absence of European security interests in Chad and the Central African Republic was one of the reasons why the mission struggled to make a lasting impact on the region (Seibert 2010) .
Guinea-Bissau
Much of the attention paid by Europeans to Guinea-Bissau has focussed on the country's role as an important transit-point for drug trafficking. Concerns about drugs and organised crime were central factors behind the EU mission to Guinea-Bissau which ended in September 2010. The aim of the mission was to provide assistance and advice to the reform of the country's security sector so that it could implement the National Security Sector Reform Strategy. Particular emphasis was given to finalising basic legislation underpinning the new security structures in the sectors of defence, police and justice. The mission received criticism from some quarters, mostly because its central objective of reducing the involvement of high-level officials in the international drug trade was largely unrealised. The decision to end the mission was taken after political instability and lack of respect for the rule of law made it impossible for the EU to deploy a follow-up mission, as was originally planned. In the wake of the mission, the EU scaled back development assistance to the country, a decision which has been described as a "serious tactical error" which weakened reform-minded leaders but not the military officers who profit from organised crime (Bello, 2012) .
Aid allocation
The European Commission provided development aid to 143 countries in 2010.
Inevitably such a global engagement is driven by varying constellations of interests and priorities across partners and regions. Security -in both its 'hard' and 'soft' dimensions -is certainly a major factor in shaping the pattern of Commission aid allocations. Table 2 shows that Turkey is the biggest recipient of Commission aid, and although it is hardly a security threat per se, it is certainly an important geo-strategic partner for Europe. In the Palestinian (PAA) case the Commission pays a large proportion of the public sector salaries, an important element in maintaining stability that serves Israel's security interests as well as Europe's. Afghanistan became the epitome of a 'failed state' that posed a security threat to the West after 9/11. The country started to receive large amounts of aid from the Commission aid following the NATO invasion in late 2001.
Closer to home, the Commission's aid budget to Georgia was quadrupled following its short war with Russia in 2008. proportion of the total increase in aid can be accounted for by increases to the neighbourhood, three key security-relevant countries (Iraq and Afghanistan -in which EU member states fought wars in the period and Pakistan, the country closely intertwined with the Afghanistan war), and nine fragile states in Africa. 9 However, as discussed above, these increases cannot solely be attributed to security concerns.
Perhaps more importantly for the securitisation debate, increases in aid to key 'security relevant partners' do not appear to have come at the expense of aid to other countries.
EU member states set the parameters within which the Commission operates and influence decisions about aid allocations. The Commission is sometimes seen as a 'donor of last resort' by member states keen to maintain the visibility of bilateral programmes in more stable countries, while avoiding potential failures. As a result, the Commission's role in fragile and post-conflict countries, where security concerns are high on the agenda, government capacities are lacking, institutions are weak and poverty reduction is difficult, has grown. Security is clearly a priority in such cases, and the risks posed by 'state failure' to Europe are sometimes used to explain decisions to intervene.
Nevertheless the objectives and conduct of fragile state interventions are more often focussed on improving the security of local populations and helping local authorities build capacity and legitimacy as a necessary condition of sustainable development.
Conclusions
In conclusion, we return to the questions that we posed at the outset. First, regarding the extent to which 'securitisation' has changed the way the donor organisation thinks about foreign aid, it is clear from policy documents, institutional changes and instruments that security and development have become more closely interrelated in the EU's international engagement since 2000. Whether 'securitisation' has been a causal factor in this is less clear. One driving factor has been the evolution of the EU itself as an international actor, particularly in the security field. However, this does not mean that the critical view of securitisation is invalid with regard to the EU. There are certainly cases where EU security interests come first, with potentially negative consequences for development -such as operation Atalanta -and others where European security concerns are an important driver of increases in aid, such as in Afghanistan. In Africa, perceived threats to Europe provide a backdrop to policy decisions in some instances, and are sometimes cited as public justifications for specific interventions, such as in the case of Guinea-Bissau. The EU is a large actor with a global reach, and it is also a complex policymaking system where many actors can influence policy on specific issues. Given this construction, it is no surprise that different policy programmes and specific actions can be driven by differing constellations of interests.
Second, the EU has certainly used key concepts, such as fragile states and whole-ofgovernment approaches, to reflect new perspectives on aid allocation and effectiveness.
The EU is by no means alone in this -its policy positions on engagement with fragile and post-conflict countries are in line with those of the rest of the OECD donor community.
The EU's engagement with post-conflict and fragile countries is (mostly) directed more toward conflict prevention and establishing the conditions in which socio-economic development can take place, than toward nullifying threats to Europe or protecting the national or commercial interests of European actors. The two instruments with which the EU explicitly pursues activities at the nexus of security and development policy -the IfS and the APF -are used to assist in the provision of human security as a precondition for development.
Third, it is difficult to argue with any certainty that securitisation -whether critically or positively conceived -has modified the distribution of aid, including through higher aid flows to new priority countries. Although there are parallels between EU aid allocations and countries that are important for security reasons, there are many causal factors.
Threat perception may explain large aid allocations to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and path dependency or solidarity with NATO partners may also play a role in influencing decisions. In the EU neighbourhood, proximity has complex implications and considerations of regional stability and security threats are usually on the agenda.
However in all of these countries poverty is still a major problem. Decisions to allocate resources cannot always be reduced to considerations of whether the partner represents a security risk to Europe, to its neighbours or to itself.
There is little evidence that the Commission has been able to use security concerns to mobilise additional resources. Arguments in favour of increasing the size of the EU's aid budget have tended to focus on meeting Europe's Monterrey commitment to spend 0.7% of GNI on ODA (Maxwell, 2011) . The Lisbon Treaty expressly focuses the EU's aid on poverty reduction, and the debate over the use of EDF funds for the APF illustrates restrictions on the uses of EU aid that nation-states do not face to the same extent. Public statements from EU development policymakers do not usually emphasise the security dimension, even though the EU is active in more fragile states than most national development agencies. This does not mean that Commission officials are unaware of the traction that security-related justifications for aid can have. They are often wont to stress the potential for addressing security and development challenges at the EU level, where member states can pool resources and deploy a range of instruments across the entire peacekeeping-peacebuilding-statebuilding process. However this does not add up to an instrumentalisation of foreign aid for the purposes of pursuing primarily security goals, and nor has it provided a new justification and means for non-development actors to use aid for other purposes.
The European Commission (and more recently the EEAS) have exhibited a pragmatic approach to the security-development nexus. To the extent that the Commission has promoted and enacted the securitization of foreign aid, this has been, on balance, an effort to improve the coherence of security and development policy at the EU level. At the policy level, recognition that while development and security are interdependent, measures to pursue them may be counterproductive has led to efforts to improve the coherence of policy frameworks and the creation of tailored instruments, especially the IfS and the APF. This process has had a positive influence on the EU's effectiveness and reputation as a development actor, especially in Africa.
